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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOAN OSBORN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930301-CA

Priority No. 3

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order revoking defendant's
probation for a conviction of uttering a forged prescription, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(4) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1993) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly revoke defendant's
probation?
"A determination to revoke probation is within the
discretion of the trial court. We will reverse only if the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the court's
decision is so deficient that it must be concluded the trial
court abused its discretion.

Furthermore, the court's underlying

factual findings supporting its conclusion that defendant
violated probation will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous."

State v. Ruesga, 851 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah App.

1993) (citations omitted).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with four counts of
uttering a forged prescription, all third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1993) (R.
6-8).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to one

count and the State moved for the dismissal of the remaining
three counts (R. 17, 19-25).
After a competency hearing on July 3, 1990 (R. 67-69),
where defendant was found competent to proceed, the trial court
sentenced defendant to 36 months probation with the conditions
that she take all prescribed medications and meet with a
psychiatrist to determine if her mental condition required
inpatient treatment (R. 65-66). x
On February 19, 1991, Adult Probation and Parole (AP &
P) alleged that defendant was unwilling to cooperate with her
probation officer or with her psychiatrist (R. 71). On March 11,
1991, the trial court found that these actions violated the terms
of defendant's probation (R. 87). The court then ordered a
ninety day evaluation by the Department of Corrections (R. 88).

^Apparently, defendant's competency to plead guilty was
never challenged. The State, however, moved for this competency
determination prior to sentencing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
77-15-3 (1990) (R. 32-35).
2

Subsequently, on June 10, 1991, the court revoked defendant's
probation and ordered defendant to commit herself to the Utah
State Hospital (R. 90).
On July 22, 1991, the trial court amended the terms of
probation to allow defendant to enter into an outpatient mental
health treatment program (R. 99). After defendant failed to find
a program that would accept her (R. 116-21), the court again
amended the terms of probation to require defendant to find such
a program and to "comply with the terms and conditions of such a
treatment program" (R. 123).
Despite this new condition, defendant refused to meet
with the psychiatrist at the Salt Lake County Jail and refused to
sign the amended Probation Agreement (R. 131-32).

An order to

show cause hearing was held on August 12, 1991, and defendant's
probation was further amended to include the requirement that she
take an antipsychotic drug (R. 135-36).
On September 11, 1992, AP & P filed a third
progress/violation report alleging that defendant had committed
an assault, failed to report to AP & P and failed to take her
prescribed medication (R. 136-39).

Defendant failed to appear at

the subsequent order to show cause hearing on September 21, 1992,
and the trial court issued a bench warrant for her arrest (R.
140) .
At the next order to show cause hearing on October 6,
1992, concerning these violations, defendant "interrupted the
Hearing [sic] and was unable to control herself," therefore, the
3

court ordered another mental health evaluation and continued the
hearing (R. 155-57).

Subsequently, on November 16, 1992, the

court found defendant incompetent to proceed with the hearing and
again ordered defendant to the Utah State Hospital (R. 168-69,
172-73).
After defendant received therapy at the Utah State
Hospital, the court found defendant competent to proceed on
February 26, 1993 (R. 187-88, 342). At that hearing, defendant
agreed she committed the violations (R. 357) . Based on
defendant's admissions, the court revoked defendant's probation
and reinstated it with the conditions that defendant enter into a
mental health program as soon as possible and that defendant
participate in that therapy and take all prescribed medications
(R. 187-88, 190-94, 359-64).
On March 22, 1993, AP & P filed a violation report
alleging that defendant failed to comply with her contract for
therapy at the Adult Residential Treatment Unit (ARTU) by wearing
her sunglasses indoors, twice failing to talk with anyone during
group therapy, violating the unit's visitation policy, ripping up
a release of information form and possessing a non-prescription
bottle of cough medicine (R. 195-97, 384-91).

Each of these

violations occurred within defendant's first seven days at ARTU.
See State's Exhibit 2, attached as addendum A.

When defendant

failed to appear for a hearing on these charges the trial court
issued a bench warrant on March 22, 1993 (R. 198-202).

4

After defendant's arrest, the court held an order to
show cause hearing on April 1, 1993. Defendant admitted that she
had read and understood the requirements for treatment at ARTU
(R. 398) and that she obtained unauthorized non-prescription
medication (R. 399-400).

Based on defendant's admissions and the

testimony of ARTU representatives, the court found that defendant
had wilfully violated the terms of her probation by failing to
engage in treatment, having an unauthorized visitor and
possessing Robitussin (R. 220, 412-14).

See Findings of

Probation Violation and Commitment, attached as Addendum B.

The

court revoked defendant's probation and ordered that she serve
the originally imposed zero to five year sentence in the Utah
State Prison (R. 208-09, 218-22, 414-15).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts relevant to this appeal are contained in the
Statement of the Case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant failed to assert in the trial court that due
to her mental illness she was unable to "wilfully" violate the
terms of her probation.

This failure precludes this Court from

addressing this issue for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, defendant fails to satisfy the
marshalling requirement by not demonstrating how the evidence
when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's
finding is insufficient to support that finding.

For this

reason, this Court should decline to review this claim.
5

However,

should the Court determine to reach the merits of defendant's
sufficiency claim, the evidence was sufficient for the trial
court to make the factual finding that defendant wilfully
violated her probation.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVOKED DEFENDANT'S
PROBATION
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in revoking her
probation because the State did not present sufficient evidence
to prove she wilfully violated the terms of her probation.
of App. at 4-7.

Br.

While defendant frames her argument as a

sufficiency claim, her argument appears to be that the State was
required to prove her mental capability to conform to the terms
of her probation.

Br. of App. at 6.

However, defendant failed

to present that claim to the trial court and she has therefore
waived this Court's consideration of that claim,,

See State v.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991) ("a defendant who
fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred from
asserting it initially on appeal").
Moreover, even if defendant's claim is reviewed as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant fails to
show how the evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to
the judgment is insufficient as a matter of law.

See State v.

Chavez, 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) .

6

A. Defendant Waived this Court's
Consideration of Her Alleged Claim of Error
by Failing to Make that Claim in the Trial
Court.
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that in
order for the State to show a wilful violation of probation, the
State must present expert testimony that defendant "had the
capacity to successfully complete her mental health treatment."
Br. of App. at 6.

However, defendant did not claim in the trial

court that her mental illness precluded her from complying with
the terms of her probation, nor that the State must present
expert testimony to make such a showing in order to establish the
willfulness of her violation.

See Transcript of Order to Show

Cause Evidentiary Hearing, March 29, 1993 (R. 366-416).
Defendant's failure to assert this issue below deprived
the court of any opportunity to rule on this issue and she has
thereby waived its consideration on appeal.2

Cf. State v.

Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992) (absent special
justification for failing to present all available grounds in
support of a suppression motion, this Court will not rule on
those grounds not addressed in the trial court).

See also

Archambeau 820 P.2d at 922.

defendant did raise this issue in her Petition for Issuance
of Certificate of Probable Cause and supporting Affidavit of
Defense Counsel (R. 236-44). However, as this Court noted in
Brown, "a Rule 27 petition does not provide the trial court an
adequate, timely opportunity to consider the issues raised
therein so as to give life to unpreserved issues first brought to
light in that petition." 856 P.2d at 363.
7

Based on the foregoing this Court should refuse to
consider the issue on appeal. As this Court stated in Brobera v.
Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989), "[w]hen there is no
indication in the record on appeal that the trial court reached
or ruled on an issue, this [C]ourt will not undertake to consider
the issue on appeal."

Furthermore, this Court has recognized:

The purpose of requiring a properly presented
objection is to "put [] the judge on notice of
the asserted error and allow[] the
opportunity for correction at that time in
the course of the proceeding."
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting
Brobera, 782 P.2d at 201) (brackets in original).

Accordingly,

this Court should decline to address defendant's claim of error.
B.

Defendant's Claim of Error is Without Merit.

Notwithstanding defendant's clear waiver, should this
Court determine to reach the merits of defendant's asserted
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, her challenge is
without merit.
A trial court's finding of a wilful probation violation
is factual and this Court will not reverse that finding unless it
is clearly erroneous, or against the clear weight of the
evidence.

State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah App. 1991);

see State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1990).

In order to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a court's
finding of a wilful violation, defendant must recite all evidence
in favor of the court's ruling and then, viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to that ruling, establish why this
8

evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding of a
violation.

Chavez, 840 P.2d at 848; State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d

80, 82 (Utah App. 1991); Martinez, 811 P.2d at 208.
Here, defendant agrees that she engaged in conduct that
prevented her from participating in therapy.

Br. of App. at 3.

However, defendant fails to demonstrate how that conduct was
insufficient to support the trial court's finding of a wilful
violation.

Defendant merely asserts that in order for the State

to prove a wilful violation that expert testimony is required to
demonstrate that she was mentally capable of engaging in therapy.
Br. of App. at 5.

Defendant has failed to meet the marshalling

requirement and this Court should refuse to consider the merits
of defendant's insufficiency claim.

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d

470, 473 (Utah App. 1991).
C. Defendant Wilfully Violated the Terms of
Her Probation.
Defendant's failure to demonstrate how the evidence was
insufficient is made plain by a brief examination of the
pertinent evidence.

As a condition of probation, the trial court

required defendant to "enter into and successfully complete the
treatment and therapy of Valley Mental Health."

Findings of

Probation Violation, (R. 192-94), attached as Addendum B.
Defendant admits that she failed to successfully complete the
treatment program. Br. of App. at 3. Additionally, as outlined
in Part A above, there was no dispute below about defendant's
capacity to conform to the terms of probation.

9

Moreover, defendant admitted that she knowingly entered
into the contract at ARTU.

Specifically, she stated, "I read it,

and understood it and I felt very good about it" (R. 3 98).

She

also admitted that she understood the program's requirements
concerning her medication (R. 3 99).

Furthermore, defendant

clearly stated a desire and willingness to participate in the
program if she were allowed to return (R. 400) . She clearly
indicated that she "could cooperate with the group.

I could

enjoy the activities" (R. 401). Her desire to return to the
program

and her stated ability to cooperate, directly

contradicts her assertion on appeal that she was mentally unable
to complete that program.3
Given these admissions, the trial court correctly found
that defendant wilfully violated the terms of her probation.

In

making this finding the court summarized the evidence:
She was admitted to ARTU on March 16, 1993.
And beginning the very next day she began to
refuse to cooperate -- this in the face of
the Court's specific order to her and her
promise to the Court at the previous hearing
in February that if the Court granted her the
privilege of probation again, that she would
cooperate fully and take all medications
prescribed by physicians, treating
physicians.
It appears to me, and based on her own
testimony, she entered in the contract at the
Additionally, prior to entering into the ARTU program on
March 16, 1993, the court found defendant competent to proceed on
February 26, 1993 (R. 190-91). There is nothing in the record to
indicate that defendant's mental health deteriorated after this
competency determination. Furthermore, defendant never asserted
any inability to comply with the terms of probation prior to this
appeal.
10

ARTU unit. That she did that knowingly; that
she understood what she was doing when she
entered into that contract. The contract
requires her to participate fully in all
group activities, take all medications as
prescribed; and that if she has any problems
or any concerns about her medications, she
agreed to talk with medical staff about them.
Then in violation of that contract and in
violation of her promise to the Court at the
time the Court agreed to allow her to enter
into the ARTU program, she began to refuse to
participate in the group activities. She
participated in some activities but those
seemed to be the, quote, unquote, "fun"
activities and not the other activities that
were specifically designed to help her with
the problems that she clearly has.
Also, in violation of the contract and her
probation, she had someone bring her
Robitussin. And if she had concerns about
the oral Prolixin, she did not comply with
the contract because she did not take those
concerns to the staff and talk about them,
but rather she resorted to her own self-help
which she claims was taking the RobitussinDM.
It appears to me, based on all the evidence
that's been presented, that Miss Osborn has
wilfully violated the terms and conditions of
her probation.
(R. 413-14).

These extensive oral findings, together with the

court's written findings, addendum B, are amply supported by the
record and clearly indicate defendant's wilful violation of the
conditions of her probation.
Furthermore, after making the factual findings outlined
above, the trial court explained why it was exercising its
discretion by revoking defendant's probation:
Now, with regard to what to do. As I
observed before, Miss Osborn has been before
this Court on three orders to show cause. I
11

made it quite clear to Miss Osborn at the
last hearing what would happen if she did not
comply with this program['s] requirements and
all the terms and conditions of her
probation.
I feel that the amenities that are available
to Miss Osborn on probation are fully
exhausted. I feel that I have absolutely no
alternative at this point but to revoke Miss
Osborn's probation and reinstate the term
prescribed by law, the sentence prescribed by
law for the offense to which she pleaded
guilty. An I hereby order that she be
transported to the Utah State Prison for the
term prescribed by law.
(R. 414-15).
Despite these findings, defendant asserts that the
State was required to present expert testimony to show that she
was able "to comply with the mental health treatment requirements
ordered by the Court . . .."

Br. of App. at 5.

However,

defendant's unsupported assertion misapprehends the legal issue:
whether the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial
court's finding of a wilful violation.

State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d

270, 278 (Utah App. 1990).
In Archuleta, this Court defined "wilful" as it is used
in a probation revocation determination where the probation term
involves the payment of money.

812 P.2d at 84. The Court made

clear that the term "wilful" in that situation, does not equate
with the word intentional, as it is used in other criminal
situations; rather, a finding of a wilful violation of a
probation term for the payment of money is the same as a finding
that defendant failed to make "bona fide efforts to meet the
conditions of probation."

Id..
12

This Court applied the same bona fide effort standard
in State v. Ruesaa, 851 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah App. 1993).

In

Ruesaa, the Court upheld the trial court's finding of a wilful
violation.

The Court agreed that,

where defendant did not make a bona fide
effort to cooperate with probation officials
to initiate his probation, despite warnings
by the court, he willfully violated his
probation.
Id.

That same determination is appropriate in this case.
Here, defendant admitted that she knowingly entered

into a therapy contract with ARTU and then failed to participate
in that therapy (R. 398-401, 413-14), addendum B.

These

admissions amply support the trial court's finding of a wilful
violation.

They are likewise sufficient to meet the lack of a

bona fide effort requirement established by Archuleta and Ruesga.
Accordingly, defendant's insufficiency claim is without merit and
this Court should affirm the trial court's findings.

13

CONCLUSION
Defendant's failure to preserve the issue of her mental
capacity to meet the terms of probation below precludes appellate
review.

Additionally, she fails to demonstrate that the evidence

viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's finding of
a wilful violation of the terms of her probation is insufficient
as a matter of law.

This Court should therefore affirm the trial

court's revocation of defendant's probation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JP

day of February, 1994

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

RALPH E. CHAMNESS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by first class mail
to ROBERT BREEZE, attorney for appellant, 211 East Broadway,
Suite 215, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this l__

February, 1994.
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defendant's probation.

The State was represented by Deputy Salt

Lake County Attorney, Walter R. Ellett.
Testimony and documented evidence was presented to the Court
and arguments made by counsel.

The Court having considered the

matter does now make and enter the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Commitment:
FINDING OF FACT
1.

That

the

defendant,

Joan

Osborn,

was

placed

on

probation under the supervision of Adult Parole and Probation on
the 3rd day of July, 1990, the Court having imposed sentence on
the defendant that she be committed to the Utah State Prison for
a term not to exceed 5 years the execution thereof being stayed
by the Court.
2.

That the defendant appeared before the Court on the

10th day of June, 1991, at which time her probation was revoked
and reinstated for a period of 36 months.
3.

That on the 26th day of February, 1993, the defendant

again appeared before the Court at which time the Court revoked
her

probation

and

reinstated

the

same

with

the

additional

provision that the defendant enter into and successfully complete
the treatment and therapy of Valley Mental Health.
4.

That on the 17th day of March, 1993 defendant entered

into a Level 1 contract for treatment with Valley Mental Health
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1.

That the probation of the defendant, Joan Osborn be and

the same is hereby revoked.
2.

That the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah

take the defendant, Joan Osborn and deliver her forthwith to the
warden of the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah where the said
defendant shall be confined and imprisoned in accordance with the
sentence imposed by the Court on July 3, 1990.
3.

It is the recommendation of the Court that the Board of

Fardons grant credit for time served to the defendant for any
jail time served prior to and while awaiting sentence on July 3,
1990.
4.

The Court further recommends that the Board of Pardons

consider the period spent by the defendant at the Utah State
Hospital

for

a

competency

evaluation,

after

sentence,

determining the prison time to be served by the defendant.
DATED this

day of April, 1993.
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